During the Spring Festival, the release of China's generative artificial intelligence (AI) enterprise model DeepSeeker R1 caused a huge uproar in the technology industry. DeepSeeker R1 is free to use and open-source. Last year's Two Sessions, artificial intelligence+was first included in the government work report of the Two Sessions. The Central Economic Work Conference at the end of last year emphasized the need to carry out artificial intelligence+actions this year, becoming a major economic task second only to expanding domestic demand. Therefore, it is expected that policies supporting artificial intelligence+actions will be implemented, and the next important policy window period for the Two Sessions will be. The industry believes that we will lead the implementation of AI applications and deeply empower various industries with AI. New industries such as robotics and autonomous driving will also blossom like a hundred flowers. Similarly, they cannot do without the empowerment of related silicone products. Many silicone companies plan to fully embrace DeepSeeker R1. As of February 7th, the Luxi hydrolysate website reported a price of 12300 yuan/ton, the mainstream spot price for DMC was 12700-13500 yuan/ton, the mainstream spot price for raw rubber was 14000-14700 yuan/ton, the mainstream price for 107 rubber was 13500-14000 yuan/ton, the mainstream price for domestic silicone oil was 14800-16500 yuan/ton, and the mainstream price for imported silicone oil was 18500-19500 yuan/ton. 421 # metal silicon is reported at 12500-13100 yuan/ton, chloromethane is reported at 2650-2750 yuan/ton, and high hydrogen silicone oil mainstream is reported at 7500-7800 yuan/ton. Single enterprises have resumed production across the entire line.
Recently, the official website of the Emergency Management Bureau of a county in Zhejiang Province released an investigation report on a general fire accident that occurred in a workshop of a large organic silicon factory on July 19, 2024. Nature of the accident: After investigation by the accident investigation team, it was determined that the "7.19" fire accident at the Green Silicon based New Material Product Development Center of the organic silicon company was a production safety liability accident.
According to the official website, at 12:58 pm on July 19, 2024, a fire accident occurred in the product development center of the silicone company, causing a fire in the Class A workshop and its surroundings, with a burnt area of 400 square meters. At 14:57 on July 19, 2024, the open flame on the scene was extinguished, and the accident did not cause any casualties. The incubation project of the company's product development center was registered in December 2021. At the time of the accident, the incubation project of the company's product development center was still in the trial production stage. The accident occurred in Workshop A, which mainly includes production units for phenyl branched silicone oil, phenyl hydrolysate, silsesquioxane, type II methyl branched silicone oil, and type II vinyl branched silicone oil. At the time of the accident, Workshop A was conducting trial production of Type II methyl branched silicone oil.
Accident occurrence: On July 19, 2024, according to work arrangements, Workshop A was conducting trial production of Type II methyl branched silicone oil. At 11:41, tons of alcohol containing water overflowed from the bucket. At 12:45-49, a group of staff went to the site to clean up the spilled alcohol containing water and reported the situation to their superiors over the phone. At around 12:40, another group of workers arrived at the pipe rack near the filling workshop in Class A workshop, preparing to carry out the unfinished hot work in the morning. At around 12:50, after climbing onto the pipe rack, it was found that the welding machine had not scanned the code and could not be used normally. At 12:56, turn on the welding machine. After the welding machine is connected, the water pipe begins to be welded. At 12:58, sparks splashed during welding ignited the alcohol containing water in the drainage ditch and quickly spread.
The direct cause of the accident: During the water separation process of the neutralization kettle in the Class A workshop of the incubation project of the product development center, the workshop operators did not take care of it properly, resulting in the overflow of alcohol containing water (with an ethanol content of about 20-40%) from the ton bucket and flowing into the workshop floor, drainage ditch, etc. It caught fire after encountering sparks generated by welding operations.
Indirect causes of the accident: (1) Inadequate safety management. One issue is inadequate personnel management, with no dedicated person assigned to monitor and collect the ton barrels containing alcohol water. Additionally, during noon, there was no one on duty in the workshop, resulting in the overflow of alcohol water. The second issue is inadequate identification of the hazards associated with alcohol containing water, failure to analyze emergency response measures after overflow, and failure to establish operating procedures for ton bucket recycling of alcohol containing water. The third issue is inadequate work coordination and management. After the overflow of alcohol containing water, the surrounding environment of the material overflow was not effectively inspected, and hot work was not detected and stopped in a timely manner. The fourth issue is the improper storage of materials, which were piled up on the north side of the fire escape in Class A workshop. After the fire broke out, the materials piled up on site were ignited, causing the fire to spread.
(2) Inadequate management of hot work operations. Firstly, there was no communication between the discharge of alcohol containing water and the cross operation of hot work in Class A workshop, and the Class A workshop leader did not sign and confirm the hot work permit. The second issue is the failure to implement measures to prevent splashing of fire flowers during high-altitude hot work operations, and the failure to adopt isolation measures such as asbestos cloth and fireproof blankets for the trench below the hot work site. Thirdly, there was no safety risk disclosure to the hot work personnel, and no gas concentration analysis was conducted before starting the work in the afternoon.
(3) During the trial production of type II methyl branched silicone oil, the ethanol content did not meet the requirements for reuse, and the company suspended the trial production of the product. During the debugging of the recycling system, the alcohol containing water in the first neutralization kettle of Class A workshop was temporarily transferred to a plastic ton bucket through a lined steel wire plastic hose. The temporarily stored alcohol containing water was used for the debugging of the recycling system. Due to inadequate supervision by workshop workers, alcohol containing water overflowed and flowed into the workshop floor, drainage ditches, and other areas. It caught fire after encountering sparks generated by welding operations.